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Peer-to-peer networks are an attractive alternative to classical
client-server architectures in several fields of application such
as voice-over-IP telephony and file sharing. Recently, a new
peer-to-peer solution called the InterPlanetary File System
(IPFS) has attracted attention, which promises to re-decentralise
the Web. Being increasingly used as a stand-alone application,
IPFS has also emerged as the technical backbone of various other
decentralised solutions and was even used to evade censorship.
Decentralised applications serving millions of users rely on IPFS
as one of their crucial building blocks. This popularity makes
IPFS attractive for large-scale attacks. We have identified a
conceptual issue in one of IPFS’s core libraries and demonstrate
their exploitation by means of a successful end-to-end attack. We
evaluated this attack against the IPFS reference implementation
on the public IPFS network, which is used by the average user
to share and consume IPFS content. Results obtained from
mounting this attack on live IPFS nodes show that arbitrary
IPFS nodes can be eclipsed, i.e. isolated from the network, with
moderate effort and limited resources. Compared to similar
works, we show that our attack scales linearly even beyond
current network sizes and can disrupt the entire public IPFS
network with alarmingly low effort. The vulnerability set
described in this paper has been assigned CVE-2020-109371.
Responsible disclosure procedures are currently being carried
out and have led to mitigations being deployed, with additional
fixes to be rolled out in future releases. Public disclosure has
already been coordinated.
1 Introduction
Modern computer networks typically rely on one of two funda-
mental architectural models. The client-server model, which
is the predominating model in the World Wide Web (WWW),
clearly distinguishes network nodes into content providers
(i.e. servers) and content consumers (i.e. clients). In fields of
application, where a strict separation of roles is undesirable,
1 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2020-10937
computer networks based on the peer-to-peer (P2P) model
have gained ground. Entities participating in P2P networks
are equal to a large extent, enabling decentralised applications.
This, in turn, makes it possible to escape centralised control and
governance as illustrated by cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin [20],
and systems like Ethereum2, for example.
Recently, a new P2P-based solution called the InterPlanetary
File System (IPFS) has attracted attention. IPFS defines itself
as a “peer-to-peer hypermedia protocol designed to make the
web faster, safer, and more open”3. Developed by Protocol
Labs4, the ambitious goal of IPFS is to re-decentralise the
WWW in order to relieve it from the drawbacks of classical
client-server-based architectures. To achieve this goal, IPFS
replicates and distributes content among participants.
During the past few years, IPFS has increasingly gained
traction. Protocol Labs reported a 30x growth in network size in
2019 and millions of users every week consuming IPFS content
through their HTTP to IPFS gateway [14]. The report also
mentions hundreds of thousands of users actively participating
in the IPFS core network and hundreds of individual developers
contributing every month to the IPFS code base on GitHub.
At the same time, IPFS has also established itself as the
technical foundation for various other decentralised applications.
For instance, IPFS acts as one of the enabling technologies for
Filecoin [12], a cryptocurrency developed by Protocol Labs,
pitched as a robust foundation for humanity’s information5.
Filecoin has had one of the largest ever initial coin offerings
(ICOs) to date, raising over $205Mio [1]. Amongst others,
IPFS also serves as the technical foundation of DTube6, a
decentralised video platform with millions of active daily users.
Services like Textile7, for example, seek to lower the barrier to
using IPFS, while Pinata8 offers guaranteed data availability and
IPFS-based hosting. Moreover, the cryptocurrency Ethereum
will be using libp2p, a key component of IPFS as the networking
layer for the Ethereum 2.0 network [25]. The growing relevance
of IPFS is also underpinned by the fact that the Opera web
2 https://ethereum.org/en/ 3 https://ipfs.io
4 https://protocol.ai 5 https://filecoin.io
























browser has added native IPFS support on Android [2] recently.
Finally, IPFS has also been used to evade censorship. For
instance, in 2017 the Catalan independence movement used
IPFS after being declared illegal [11]. This increased popularity
leads to the general question of the resilience of ungoverned,
open P2P systems against attacks inherent to this model. The
works of Heilman et al. [8], Marcus, Heilman, and Goldberg [15]
and Henningsen et al. [9] aiming at Bitcoin and Ethereum nodes
clearly show that attack vectors inherent to P2P systems can be
exploited in practice to isolate individual participants, which is
most relevant for cryptocurrency-specific attacks. Based on
the raising popularity of IPFS, these observations lead to the
following research question: Is it possible to design a low-cost,
global attack on a decentralised P2P system that is used in
practice, such that it scales well with network size?
Contribution and Scope This paper presents an end-to-end
eclipse attack on IPFS, exploiting a conceptual issue in a core
component of IPFS that compromises the system’s overall
security. We evaluated our attack against the IPFS reference
implementation, go-ipfs, version 0.4.23 and the decentralised
P2P network spanned by those nodes. In particular, our
contribution is fourfold:
Attack We introduce an end-to-end eclipse attack on IPFS.
This attack enables an attacker to single out network nodes
of their choice, partition, and disrupt the IPFS network.
Implementation We describe successful mounting of the
proposed attack on live IPFS nodes, even those part of
critical infrastructure.
Evaluation We elaborate on the threat potential of the attack,
concluding that even modestly powerful attackers can carry
out the attack to disrupt the whole public IPFS network.
Countermeasures We have reported our findings to Protocol
Labs, resulting in countermeasures being rolled out. While
the specific attack presented here has since been mitigated,
the hardening process is still ongoing, highlighting
the sustainable impact of this work on systems used
in production. IPFS 0.5 released in May 2020 already
includes a major rewrite of a previously vulnerable core
component. The 0.6.1 version of IPFS introduced a bulk of
changes that further contribute to attack resiliency and
inflate the cost of our attack by several orders of magnitude.
The current 0.7 version finally breaks compatibility with
older, vulnerable releases.
The issue we uncovered is a conceptual one and thus has an
impact beyond IPFS itself. Actually weaponising this weakness
requires specific attack vectors, three of which were discovered
to affect the public DHT-based IPFS network, which will be
referred to as IPFS DHT in this paper. This is the network
a user will interact with when using the official desktop or
command-line IPFS distributions downloadable from ipfs.io.
A detailed explanation on this terminology with respect to the
attack scope is provided as part of Section 4, that provides
details on how the attack was evaluated.
At the time of discovering the vulnerability enabling our
attack (April 2020), go-ipfs 0.4.23 was the most current release.
Due to the modularity of IPFS and the wide use of (parts of) it in
other projects, our attack’s impact beyond the public DHT-based
IPFS network needs to be evaluated on a per-project basis, which
is beyond the scope of this work9. However, as mitigations have
been rolled out, other projects already benefited from the fixes
resulting from this work.
Paper Outline This paper is structured as follows. Relevant
background information is provided in Section 2 to support an in-
depth understanding of our attack and its consequences. Details
on the attack itself are introduced in Section 3. Subsequently,
figures obtained from applying our attack on live IPFS nodes
to evaluate the attack’s feasibility are presented in Section 4.
Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures in Section 5,
introduce related scientific work in Section 6, and conclude the
paper in Section 7. Appendixes provide details on the evaluation
procedure, information on ethical aspects of our work, as well
as scaled-up versions of figures used throughout the main paper
for better legibility.
2 Preliminaries
To ensure a comprehensive understanding of the attack described
in this paper, this section provides necessary background infor-
mation. Section 2.1 thus provides a technical overview on IPFS.
In-depth technical details are introduced in Section 2.2, which
focuses on the library libp2p implementing key functionality
of IPFS and representing the core target of our attack. Finally,
Section 2.3 provides background information on known attack
vectors for P2P networks, which have inspired our attack.
2.1 IPFS
From a technical perspective, IPFS is a distributed, content-
addressed file system, where data is not identified by name or
path, but by its hash. IPFS stores all data in a decentralised way
overlaying the whole network with a Merkle directed acyclic
graph (DAG) [18] to create a navigable structure. All content
stored in the network and every node participating in the network
are assigned a unique identifier from the same flat identifier
(ID) space. Content IDs are derived directly from the respective
data by computing the data’s cryptographic hash value. Peers,
i.e. nodes participating in the network, generate an asymmetric
cryptographic key pair. The public key serves as unique ID for
the peer. The private key is used by the peer to sign outgoing
data in order to provide receiving nodes evidence on its identity.
Summarising, IPFS builds on the concepts of the Self-certifying
File System introduced by Mazières [17] and uses public-key
cryptography for the self-certification of objects.
9 For example, the main attack vector exploited for attacking the IPFS DHT is
not present in Filecoin, according to Protocol Labs.
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Lacking any central authorities, secure and reliable con-
tent and peer discovery is a key challenge. IPFS implements
this functionality based on a Kademlia distributed hash table
(DHT) [3]. Accordingly, each node maintains its own routing
table containing information about neighbouring nodes. This
information is structured as binary tree containing mappings of
node ID to network (IP) addresses. To find a certain node or
specific data, the node traverses its own tree for the required ID.
If it is able to discover the required ID, the node can access
the associated information using the assigned network address.
Otherwise, the node asks peers that are closest to the sought-after
information. As IPFS uses Kademlia, the closest nodes can
be found by means of its exclusive OR (XOR) distance. This
last step, i.e. finding the closest nodes, can be repeated until
the required node or information is found. This approach is
proven to be efficient, taking only O(log2(network-size)) many
requests to locate any content or node. This efficiency comes at
the price of limiting the amount of routing information that can
be locally stored. To compensate for this, IPFS features a data
structure called the swarm, which essentially keeps connections
beyond the DHT. This is used for the main content-distribution
functionality of IPFS: First, the swarm is asked for data. If
someone in the swarm is able to provide it, discovering data is a
constant-time operation, if not, the DHT is used10.
IPFS has been designed to be fully open and decentralised,
thus no central authority guards it. Consequently, anyone can
join the network and identify using a generated asymmetric
cryptographic key pair. This obvious strength of IPFS is also
one of its Achilles heels, facilitating the attack proposed in this
paper, as presented in Section 2.3.
2.2 libp2p
The library libp2p11 is a stand-alone project that was originally
an integrated part of IPFS, but has since been externalised. It
encompasses a DHT, transport abstractions and other compo-
nents required to build decentralised applications. In essence,
libp2p serves as basis for various solutions that require a P2P
network. Moreover, it supports connecting through network
address translators (NATs) and to some extent also supports
browser-based environments using WebSockets [7]. IPFS is
one of many solutions that heavily rely on libp2p and its P2P
functionality.
The attack described in this paper employs a set of vulnerabil-
ities in libp2p. Accordingly, this is rather an attack on libp2p
than on IPFS. However, we also exploit the way IPFS interacts
with libp2p to increase attack efficiency. Moreover, IPFS is
the largest public libp2p-based network, which also serves as
infrastructure layer for other decentralised services. Since we
mounted our attack on the IPFS reference implementation, we




DHT As mentioned above, libp2p’s DHT is based on Kadem-
lia [16]. As of April 2020, libp2p mainly used connection-
oriented transport protocols like TCP. Consequently, nodes are
only kept in the local routing table as long as an active network
link to this node exists. The DHT’s binary tree structure allows
for a configurable amount of nodes to occupy each leaf of this
tree. Leaves are referred to as k-buckets or simply buckets. The
bucket-size parameter is called k and is set to 20 in IPFS.
Tree branches can be merged and split on-demand in case
buckets are not fully occupied or become overfull. However,
the total number of nodes that can be kept in a local routing
table is limited according to Eq. (1). Currently, libp2p uses
SHA2-256 as cryptographic hash function to derive node and
content identifiers for DHT routing, which yields a 256-bit
ID space. Note that Kademlia proposes a least-recently seen
eviction strategy, should a bucket become overfull. When using
connection-oriented transport protocols, this is implemented
implicitly using transport-layer keep-alive messages. Thus,
newly connecting peers will only replace others, in case those
others become unresponsive.
Another key feature provided by the DHT’s peer discovery
functionality, is bootstrapping: In order to initially join the
network, the IP address of at least one node already participating
in the network needs to be known. Once connected to one such
pre-known node, a newly joining peer queries this bootstrap
node’s routing table for their own ID. This prompts a response
containing the IDs and IP addresses of other nodes known to
the bootstrap node, which are closest to the newly joining peer
(from the bootstrap node’s point of view). As of version 0.4.23,
IPFS comes pre-configured with eight bootstrap nodes run by
Protocol Labs.
RT size = bits(ID space)× k (1)
Swarm IPFS raises the requirement to store connection infor-
mation that exceeds the DHT’s limited capacity. For this, IPFS
nodes make use of the so-called swarm. First and foremost, the
swarm is the set of all currently active connections and thus a
superset of the connections stored in the DHT. IPFS also uses
the swarm to speed-up content discovery by initially querying
the whole swarm for content, prior to querying the DHT12. On
its own, the swarm is unbounded, which could lead to resource
exhaustion. To prevent this, a component called the connection
manager or ConnMgr is in place, as described below.
ConnMgr The connection manager is provided by libp2p. Its
main job is to keep only a sensible amount of open connections.
This ensures that (a) resource exhaustion is prevented and (b)
content discovery and the overall P2P network flow can operate
efficiently.
Currently, libp2p features a single implementation of the




active connections (i.e. the swarm) once a minute. In case more
than a configurable threshold of connections are open (called the
highWater mark), one connection at a time is trimmed, until
the second configured threshold (called lowWater) of open
connections is reached13. Recently-established connections
(within a configurable grace period) are exempt from pruning.
Starting with the libp2p version that ships with IPFS 0.4.23,
these connections do not count towards the total amount of
active connections. This is crucial, since it prevents a cheap
attack where an attacker could simply connect highWater
many connections within the grace period to have the ConnMgr
unconditionally trim all older connections.
The main challenge with this approach is determining which
connections to trim. For this, an abstract scoring system is in
place that is available to all components interacting with libp2p.
Any interacting component is allowed to add a freely-definable
tag to any active connection and award points under this tag.
The general idea behind this approach is to keep highly useful
connections open. For instance, connections in the DHT are
awarded points according to Eq. 2. This effectively means that
closer (according to their XOR distance) nodes are awarded
higher scores and are less likely to be disconnected.
score = 5+ commonXORPrefixLen(remote ID,own ID) (2)
Other sources of points include a relaying subsystem part of
libp2p, which is used to help nodes behind firewalls connect to
the network: In short, any node can advertise themselves as relay
and offer multiplexing other nodes’ connections over an already
established link between target node and relay. Points can also
be awarded by the so-called Bitswap subsystem, which is a
core component implementing the content-distribution strategy
employed by IPFS [4].
While the applied scoring system is essential for the connec-
tion manager’s functionality, it causes a potential vulnerability:
If ways can be found to artificially inflate the score of connec-
tions to a node, this node will less likely be disconnected, even
if it behaves maliciously. The attack proposed in this paper
employs this vulnerability. As we have discovered, Bitswap
awards points even when receiving unsolicited data blocks. This
can easily result in more points than awarded from some of the
lower DHT buckets (i.e.) those containing the farthest-away
nodes. Given the swarm is a superset of the DHT, this can
lead to DHT connections being trimmed in favour of non-DHT
actively advertising data. In combination with IPFS’s inherent
susceptibility to Sybil attacks (see Section 2.3), a node can be
manipulated into eclipsing itself from the honest network. As we
will show, it is possible to execute such a strategy with extremely
low cost. It is important to note that this is a conceptual flaw
with the only variable being the actual resources required to
mount an attack.
13 Whether these connections are incoming or outgoing is irrelevant
2.3 Known Attack Strategies
IPFS is a fully open and decentralised solution with no central
coordinating or regulating authorities. These properties make
IPFS vulnerable to two different attack strategies, which are not
specific for IPFS, but apply to any P2P network with comparable
properties. The two attack strategies that make use of these
vulnerabilities have become known as Sybil and eclipse attack.
In the Sybil attack [6], a single attacker presents itself to the
network as many seemingly independent nodes by generating
multiple identities. This can subvert any network operation
that works under the assumption of interacting with distinct,
non-colluding entities, such as the distributed routing protocol
itself. Due to its decentralised nature and openness, IPFS is
conceptually vulnerable to Sybil attacks.
The second prominent strategy to compromise P2P systems is
the eclipse attack [24]. In essence, the attacker manipulates a
node’s local routing information, such that any request from or
to the victim passes through nodes controlled by the attacker.
For a structured P2P network, this requires generating identifiers
of a specific distance to the chosen victim’s identifier. Since
node identifiers in IPFS are hashed prior to computing this
distance, large numbers of IDs need to be generated and tested
to obtain IDs with suitable distances. While this may seem
infeasible, we show that a brute-force approach to this problem
actually scales well, enabling global attacks even for large
network sizes14 (see Section 3.2). Once this is done, as many
nodes as required to eclipse a victim using these IDs can be
operated by applying a Sybil attack.
Any open and fully decentralised P2P network is vulnerable
to Sybil and eclipse attacks on a conceptual level. Fortunately, a
variety of countermeasures to these generic attack strategies
exist in practice, although as of version 0.4.23, IPFS did not
include any.
3 End-to-End Eclipse Attack on IPFS
If one node after another can be eclipsed from the rest of the
network and the amount of resources required to keep nodes
from reconnecting are low, even an average-powered attacker
can disrupt P2P networks that are as a whole many orders
of magnitude more powerful than the attacker. This work
demonstrates precisely this kind of attack against the live IPFS
DHT from two distinct angles. We show how we can advance
from attacking single nodes to partitioning the network with
negligible running costs. Our implemented end-to-end attack is
able to automatically poison any node’s routing table on the
main IPFS network within minutes, regardless of the network’s
churn rate15 and to fully eclipse an average node in less than
an hour with ≈ 75% probability (see Section 4). The only
input required to start the attack is a target node’s identifier.
14 This scales, since only the network size is relevant, not the size of the ID
space. 15 The churn rate is defined as the participant turnover in the network,
i.e. how fast participants join and leave the network.
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Moreover, IPFS uses a configurable, but otherwise static set of
nodes for bootstrapping. Poisoning the bootstrap node’s routing
tables (with potentially bogus information) is therefore enough
to keep any node that carries out the bootstrap routine from
ever interfacing with other legitimate nodes16. At this point,
partitioning the IPFS DHT becomes possible.
Actually weaponising these observations to mount an attack
on the live IPFS network consists of three main steps:
ID generation: In order to eclipse a target’s routing table,
pre-generated IDs are required. Section 3.2 describes this aspect
in detail, as the cost of ID generation has a direct impact on
attack costs.
Probing: IPFS/libp2p offers a vast amount of configuration
options. Thus, we require means to probe a target’s state, as
detailed in Section 3.3.
Gaming the ConnMgr: The key part of our attack is to
trick a target’s ConnMgr into trimming all connections to
legitimate nodes, such that only malicious nodes operated by an
attacker remain. Details on this attack strategy are elaborated in
Section 3.4. Once successful, regular nodes can be kept eclipsed
with extremely low cost (see Section 3.1).
The actual attack is carried out by a stripped-down libp2p-based
node that performs a Sybil attack, which is then used to eclipse
the target. This node requires a set of pre-generated IDs (from
the ID generation step), that fit the victim’s DHT. The main
attack loop then consists of the following steps:
1. Establish as many connections to the target as possible,
each with one of the pre-generated identifiers. These
identifiers cover the lowest 33+ buckets of the victim17.
2. Establish additional connections with randomly generated
identifiers to reach a total of highWater many active
connections. This ensures periodic trimming of connections
by the target’s ConnMgr.
3. Messages are sent over each connection to inflate its score,
thus tricking the target’s ConnMgr into considering these
connections more important than those to honest network
nodes.
4. When the target’s ConnMgr trims connections to reach
lowWater many active connections, only legitimate con-
nections established within the grace period will survive.
All others will be pruned, leaving mostly those connections
established by our malicious libp2p node, since we previ-
ously tricked the target’s ConnMgr into considering our
connections more important than those to honest nodes.
Since we are able to exploit the ConnMgr to our advantage,
our connections will gradually fill up the target’s routing table
(this takes 2 minutes at most) as well as the swarm since honest
ones are pruned. When queried for content or other nodes,
our attacker nodes will filter out any information on other
16 unless measures beyond the default behaviour have been explicitly set up
17 A network of (> 233) of honest nodes would be required to fill this many
buckets, while the theoretical maximum is 256 buckets for libp2p.
Figure 1: Abstract end-to-end flow of eclipsing an IPFS node
(legitimate) nodes from responses to hinder the victim from
learning about other nodes. We rely on continuously probing
the target’s routing table to receive feedback about the attack’s
progress (see Section 3.3). In addition, we rely on the data
obtained during our attack evaluation to draw conclusions about
the state of an attack target’s swarm (see Section 4). Once
successful, only four connections suffice to keep a regular IPFS
node eclipsed, as explained in the following section. Fig. 1
presents a high-level sequence diagram of the complete end-to-
end attack flow, grouping attack steps into higher-level phases.
An additional visualisation of the state of a victim node’s buckets
during normal operation and during the attack is available in
Appendix A.
3.1 Implementation Flaws
Apart from conceptual issues we have identified the following
flaws, that contribute to our attack’s performance:
Allowing Only Inbound Connections: Although libp2p dif-
ferentiates between inbound and outbound links, this has no
bearing on the ConnMgr’s trimming routine, making it possible
to trim all outgoing connections.
Unconditional Removal of DHT Nodes: Since the ConnMgr
does not interpret scores and tags, and DHT connections do not
receive special treatment, it is possible to push all legitimate
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connections out of the DHT and replace them with malicious
ones. This goes against the original Kademlia design, which
favours older connections. Note that from the DHT’s point
of view, this characteristic is still upheld, but the ConnMgr
manually disconnects already known connections that would
prevent new ones from entering the DHT.
Stateless Connectivity Monitoring: The DHT is instructed
to re-execute a bootstrap manoeuvre to connect to pre-configured
bootstrap nodes, whenever less than four open connections
remain. However, no further action is taken even if this situation
becomes stationary. This effectively enables an attacker to keep
a node eclipsed with as little as four open connections, once an
eclipsed state is initially reached. This monitoring loop to check
connectivity is executed once a minute.
Static Bootstrap Nodes: IPFS relies on a static set of boot-
strap nodes. Although this set can be configured, a node does
not keep track of peers it was once connected to. Due to this,
a restarting node will always bootstrap against the same set
of nodes, regardless of connectivity prior to restarting. As a
consequence, compromising the default set of bootstrap nodes
will affect all nodes as soon as they restart (and not only newly
joining nodes).
Unconditional Trust: Although rigorous data integrity checks
are a core feature of the main IPFS functionality, the same can
not be said with respect to information regarding the network’s
node. This meta issue affects many subsystems. In short,
almost all claims made by a peer about its characteristics and
capabilities are taken at face value, even when simple checks
could expose cheating. As for the DHT, this makes it easily
possible to fill any node’s DHT with bogus IP addresses.
3.2 ID Generation
Our attack requires efficient generation of vast amounts of
valid identifiers to position nodes at specific distances to any
node. Thus, a one-time ID pre-generation routine is run. libp2p
supports RSA and EC keys. By generating only EC-based
identifiers, both generation times and the amount of storage
required to manage a large set of IDs is reduced compared
to RSA. To maximize throughput, we increment an integer
and interpret it as a private key18. This approach generates
8-10k keys per second per CPU core based on an Intel® Xeon®
E5-2699 v4 CPU @ 2.20GHz. Overall throughput is mainly
limited by IO speed.
Our storage format is simple and efficiently searchable: Each
generated key is stored to a file named after the first 14 bits of
the DHT identifier corresponding to the key, along with this
identifier. This set of pre-generated identifiers amounts to 29TB
of data and encompasses ≈ 146Bn individual IDs. Still, it is
possible to efficiently query this database, as the number of
entries per file remains manageable. A dedicated service in
charge of producing keys and identifiers corresponding to any
18 Since identifiers are hashed prior to calculating distances, lack of randomness
in the raw key material is not an issue.
node’s lowest 33+ DHT buckets, based on the target node’s ID
as input. Answering a query takes less than five minutes19.
3.3 Probing
In order to carry out our attack, ways to continuously probe
an attack target’s state are required. Additionally, some static
parameters are needed during the attack’s setup phase.
Setup Phase Naturally, an attack target’s IP address is re-
quired to connect to it. This information is obtained by operating
a regular IPFS node that is connected to the IPFS network, This
node is used to query the target’s IP address, which is then fed
into the actual attack carried out on a distinct machine.
Moreover, the bucket size of the target’s routing table is
required in order to advertise a precisely distributed set of
identifiers for routing table poisoning. Querying the target
for any identifier will trigger a response containing bucketSize
many peers, thus providing this information.
While lowWater and highWater marks are theoretically
required to perform our attacks, choosing too high values has no
impact on attack success rates, but only consumes more resources
than necessary. Given that even critical infrastructure like
bootstrap nodes use values of 1000 and 2000, respectively, this
does not cause any real issues with respect to attack performance.
However, simply starting with those values and and observing
the impact of connection trimming allows for detecting values
set too high, which enables reducing each value accordingly.
The interval for the ConnMgr’s connection trimming routine
is hardcoded to 1 minute. However, detecting disconnect waves
when maintaining hundreds of open connections is trivial, as our
attack operates a little over highWater many connections to
ensure that disconnect waves are triggered.
The grace period used to protect newly established connections
is irrelevant for our attack and is thus not probed.
Our attack targets the latest IPFS version (0.4.23) released as
of April 27, 2020. Earlier versions are even easier to eclipse.
However, our attack performs a strict superset of the actions
required to eclipse earlier versions and thus requires no knowl-
edge of the attack target’s IPFS version, except for increased
efficiency. Still, the IPFS protocol defines a message to remotely
query a node’s version.
Continuous Probing Our attack requires knowledge about
the target’s routing table. In essence, we need to know which
buckets are occupied by honest nodes, in order to outperform
these nodes from the ConnMgr’s point fo view. As mentioned
before, the target will respond with bucketSize many closest
peers to any query for other peers. We can thus simply traverse
the set of pre-generated identifiers used for poisoning the target’s
routing table and query for one identifier in each bucket. This
way, it is possible to construct a contiguous view of the target’s
19 This could be further sped-up thorugh parallelisation.
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routing table and know precisely which nodes occupy which
buckets. Given that our pre-generated ID set consists of ≈146Bn
nodes, this easily covers all realistically possible routing table
configurations that can ever be encountered. These queries are
performed once during each attack loop.
3.4 Gaming the ConnMgr
This section describes the main attack loop and the actions
performed to trick a victim’s ConnMgr. The overall goal is to
raise the score of the connections made by an attacker above the
highest score of any legitimate node connected to the victim.
Based on observation of live IPFS nodes, the score of connec-
tions to honest peers will usually range from 0 to around 20.
In order to reach this goal, our attack strategy relies on three
sources of points to game the ConnMgr:
DHT: Each node that occupies a DHT spot is awarded points
according to Eq 2. The amount of identifiers we pre-generate is
several orders of magnitude larger than the number of nodes
participating in the live IPFS DHT. Because of this, simply
connecting using these IDs is enough to be assigned a spot in the
target’s DHT, as most buckets for those identifiers will be empty.
We can therefore maintain more than 400 connections20 that
will be awarded enough points to become resident in the target’s
swarm. This, however is significantly less than the required
default lowWater value of 600.
Bitswap: As mentioned in Section 2.2, Bitswap awards points
for unsolicited content advertisement (which is understandable
from a content-distribution perspective). We exploit this by
continuously advertising an empty block of data. This is cheap
for an attacker, since sending such a message every few seconds
suffices, with no need to process responses and results in 10-16
points. Other ways of inflating a connection’s score based on
Bitswap include re-sending blocks a target previously requested.
Relaying: A virtually unlimited source of ConnMgr points
is the relaying subsystem that is used to help nodes located
behind NATs or firewalls reach the network. For one, simply
advertising relaying capabilities to the target already awards a
fixed amount of two points. More importantly, however, actively
relaying connections from and to the target awards one point
for each relayed connection. Given that libp2p supports multi-
plexing many virtual connections over a single (TCP) link, the
number of available ports is not a limiting factor for this strategy.
Initial experiments have shown that > 1000 connections can be
multiplexed over a single link.
This last method of obtaining points can be especially devas-
tating, since finding a countermeasure is challenging. While
pathological cases like those from our initial experiments could
be detected using heuristics, the general strategy of consider-
ing a link supporting many relayed connections important is
understandable, especially in real-world settings that include
firewalls and NATs. The required resources for creating a
20 The remainder of these connections are initially outperformed by honest
ones.
relayed connection are minimal: The only thing that is really
required is a (randomly generated) key pair to obtain a valid
self-certifying node identifier. This is then used during the
initial handshake when establishing an end-to-end-encrypted
connection. While this comprises computationally somewhat
expensive asymmetric cryptographic operations, these have
to be performed only once during connection establishment.
Overhead for the node acting as relay is also moderate. Given
that our attack strategy is based on performing a Sybil attack
from a single host no actual links between relay and relayed
nodes are required, since these nodes are, in fact, virtual.
When combining this way of inflating connection scores
with the continuous probing of a target’s routing table, a highly
efficient attack behaviour can be implemented.
In order to occupy all spots in the target’s routing table and,
subsequently, eclipse the whole swarm, any nodes previously
connected need to be outperformed. However, fully poisoning
the routing table is prioritised, since the DHT is used for peer
discovery and content routing beyond content distribution. In
order to accomplish this, estimate the highest score of any
honest node connected to the target as follows:
1. Based on the routing table information, we calculate the
highest score over all legitimate peers that reside in the
target’s routing table according to Eq. 2.
2. We consider a safety margin of 10 points, meaning that we
assume that each honest peer has an additional 10 points
awarded from other subsystems, such as Bitswap. We
apply this margin regardless of whether an honest peer is
resident in the target’s routing table or simply part of the
swarm.
3. These two numbers are then added to arrive at the target
score that needs to be beaten by at least lowWater many of
our malicious nodes in order to have the target’s ConnMgr
trim all connections to honest nodes (except for those
within the grace period).
4. In order to reach this score, we traverse the set of our
malicious nodes and start relaying connections to randomly
generated virtual nodes as required. We prioritise those
of our nodes that are based on pre-generated identifiers,
referred to as DHT nodes to fill the target’s routing table. If
this is not sufficient (which is the case for higher-than-usual
lowWater marks), we also boost the score of the random
nodes that are run to reach highWater many connections
to trigger the ConnMgr’s disconnect routine.
Careful observation might suggest that precise probing of the
target’s lowWater mark is required, since a too high estimate
would cause those of our nodes that should occupy the lower
buckets to be disconnected by the ConnMgr. While this is
technically correct, our nodes reconnect to the target within
milliseconds. This leaves only an extremely short window of
opportunity for honest nodes to slip into the target’s routing
table. This is due to the fact that routing table spots that become
vacant during a disconnect wave are not automatically filled by
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remaining connections. Instead, the DHT component of libp2p
only reacts to a well-defined set of messages to insert peers
into a node’s routing table. One such message is a ping. We
exploit this behaviour and re-establish any severed connection as
soon as the ConnMgr executes its connection trimming routine
and ping the target from all still connected nodes at the same
time. As we will elaborate in Section 4, we have evaluated this
strategy to be effective, as fully occupying any node’s routing
table takes mere minutes. Moreover, completely eclipsing nodes
with ≈ 75% probability takes less than an hour. In effect, this
results in overall negligible costs, even when seeking to disrupt
the complete public DHT-based IPFS network.
3.5 Attack Wrap-Up
Our attack exploits a variety of flaws in libp2p/IPFS, specifically
in the uncoordinated coexistence of the DHT subsystem and the
ConnMgr. This results in nodes actively trimming connections
to honest peers after mere minutes, due to the ease of tricking
the ConnMgr. As part of engaging in a responsible disclosure
process with Protocol Labs, this has been acknowledged as
a conceptual problem without an easy solution. The public
DHT-based IPFS network, by design, accepts any node as long
as it conforms to the protocol specifications. Therefore, vulnera-
bilities that have been fixed in the reference implementation
can be reintroduced into the network through nodes based on
alternative implementations.
In summary, reaching a verdict regarding the global impact
of our attack with respect to the whole IPFS ecosystem com-
prising the public DHT-based network, but also many other
services based on IPFS technology (like DTube) requires careful
investigation of each such system.
4 Evaluation
In order to gauge the impact of our attack, two key scenarios
were evaluated. Attack runs were carried out against unmodified
IPFS nodes operated within the live IPFS network. While our
main attack target was go-ipfs 0.4.23, version 0.5.0 was also
evaluated to asses the impact of countermeasures included in
this release (see Section 5). In both cases, the state of an attack
target’s swarm was queried locally at the target node, while
routing table information was obtained remotely as part of the
main attack loop (see Sections 3.3 and 3.3). First, the impact
on an average node with default parameters was measured.
Afterwards, nodes with the same configuration as the live IPFS
bootstrap nodes21 were attacked. The evaluation results for both
scenarios are provided in Figure 2. In both cases, the DHT is
fully poisoned within minutes (Sections 4.1 and 4.2 provide
in-depth discussions attack performance in each scenario).
Apart from attack performance evaluation, we provide an
estimate regarding the cost of completely disrupting the whole
21 These parameters were kindly provided to us by Protocol Labs to help
evaluating our attack’s impact.
live IPFS DHT for version 0.4.23. The IPFS reference imple-
mentation, by default, combines Bitswap (which does not reach
beyond immediate swarm connections) and DHT-based content
routing to distribute data and locate other nodes. The DHT
component itself knows two modes of operation: client mode,
and full mode (also referred to as server mode). Only those
nodes presenting themselves as operating the full DHT, and
advertising themselves as directly reachable on the IP network
layer will be added to other nodes’ local routing tables. The set
of all nodes meeting these requirements are critical to the public
IPFS DHT. Disrupting those nodes will also affect client-mode
nodes, given that ‘In IPFS, the DHT is used as the fundamental
component of the content routing system’ [23]. A collapsing
DHT will have client-mode nodes rely purely on their immediate
swarm connections for content discovery (see Section 2.1). As
an immediate effect, the long tail of available data will not be
available anymore. Maintaining a disrupted state, however,
will have severe effects: Eclipsing all DHT server-mode peers
means that all IP-layer information about honest nodes (which
is ultimately used to connect to nodes) will vanish from the
DHT. Therefore, it is sufficient to take out server-mode nodes to
also affect all clients.
The technical details on how this evaluation was carried out
can be found in Appendix C. In general, every attack run was
carried out 100 times against newly-spawned IPFS nodes with
random IDs.
4.1 Default Settings
The goal of this evaluation against an unmodified go-ipfs
v0.4.23 node with default ConnMgr parameters (lowWater =
600, highWater = 900, 20s grace period) is to see whether we
can eclipse average nodes in the IPFS network. This setting used
an attack duration of 50 minutes. Given that the pre-generated
IDs amount to more than the default 600 lowWater many peers,
poisoning a targets routing table and eclipsing the swarm is
virtually equivalent. As a result, few relayed connections are
sufficient to eclipse a target.
Figure 2a visualizes the number of attackers and other nodes
in the swarm and the target’s routing table for all 100 runs. First,
the plot clearly shows that all 100 victims were well connected
and that during the first 5 minutes the lowWater mark was
never undershoot. Starting the attack after 5 minutes, the number
of attackers in the swarm and the routing table increase almost
instantly, while the number of other nodes drops rapidly. After
less than ten minutes, the routing tables of all attacked nodes
are fully occupied by malicious nodes, while after less than
17 minutes, the probability of fully eclipsing a node is already
> 50% as shown in Fig. 3. In case an attacker’s goal is not to
fully eclipse a node but to prevent a node from discovering any
content with high probability, even less time is required. As also
shown in Fig. 3, diminishing a target’s swarm to less than ten
connections is virtually guaranteed in less than half an hour.
To better illustrate the impact of our attack on a target’s
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(a) Default settings (lowWater=600, highWater=900, grace period=20s)
(b) Bootstrap settings (lowWater=1000, highWater=2000, grace period=60s).
Two runs failed mid-way for reasons unknown. Note that only the routing table is
relevant for an attack bootstrap nodes.
Figure 2: Visualisation of the number nodes in an attack target’s
swarm and routing table for 100 runs (overlaid). Regular
operation is followed by a surge of malicious nodes after starting
the attack.
routing table, Figure 4 visualises a single target’s routing table
buckets. This reveals that initially only about 9 buckets are full
or partially filled, before the attack is started. The second time
slot on the x-axis shows the state directly after the start of the
attack. All empty spaces in all buckets until bucket 33 are filled
up by the attackers. The third time slot shows that after the
connection manager tries to reduce the number of connections,
the number of other peers decreases drastically, meaning the
node has been tricked to harm itself. After the next connection
cleanup phase, the routing table is fully poisoned.
4.2 Bootstrap Settings
This setting uses an unmodified go-ipfs v0.4.23 node configured
to the same settings as the official bootstrap nodes (lowWater =
1000, highWater = 2000, 60s grace period). The goal of this
evaluation is to see whether we can eclipse the official bootstrap
nodes. Attack duration was set to 50 minutes.
For bootstrap-node-like configurations, the number of peers
using a pre-generated ID for routing table poisoning is not
sufficient to have the ConnMgr prune all honest peers from an
attack target’s routing table. As a result, the number of relayed
connections can easily explode when seeking to fully eclipse
such a node, which can result in inadvertently overburdening
an attack target. In order to keep this period of high strain as
short as possible, we disable spawning relayed connections
as soon as a target’s DHT is fully poisoned. As shown in
Figure 2b this does not result in a successful eclipse attack
against an IPFS node run with bootstrap node configuration.
However, the swarm state is irrelevant for actual bootstrap
nodes, as swarm connections are not used for bootstrapping. In
addition, as nodes are constantly joining the network, new swarm
connections to the bootstrap nodes are established. Therefore,
attacking the swarm of bootstrap nodes is futile. Still, even
“only” poisoning the bootstrap nodes’ routing tables results in all
newly (re)connecting peers to only learn about malicious nodes,
completely disrupting the live IPFS network over time. Since
this strategy is highly churn-dependent, the estimating time
required to reach the whole network is out of this work’s scope.
4.3 Attack Costs
In order to quantify the actual costs of running large-scale attacks
against IPFS, key network metrics are required. Henningsen
et al. [10] found on average 44474 concurrently online server
nodes for the live IPFS DHT in early 2020. Of these 44474
nodes on average only 6.55% (about 3000 nodes) responded to
connection attempts, meaning the remainder of nodes are likely
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Figure 3: Probability of eclipsing a node with default settings
(lowWater=600, highWater=900, grace period=20s)
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operated by private individuals behind a NAT. As a consequence,
it is sufficient to attack these 3000 nodes to prevent the network
from responding to any queries for honest nodes connecting to
the network. In addition, permanently occupying the bootstrap
nodes’ routing tables will prevent any (re)connecting node from
ever connecting to the live IPFS network. Combining these two
strategies will thus have a devastating effect.
Up-Front Costs The only up-front cost for our attack is
related to ID generation (see Section 3.2). A quick search on
a European price comparison service reveals a per-terabyte
price of less than e20 including VAT22 for external hard drives.
This results in an up-front storage cost of less than e600, to
store 29TB of identifiers23. In order to actually generate this
many identifiers, any commodity personal computer can be
used, adding an estimated e1000 for a machine dedicated to
generating identifiers, featuring an eight-core AMD Ryzen 3700X
eight-core CPU24. This results in an estimated up-front cost of
less than e2000 including a large margin for electricity costs
that easily covers the time it takes to generate the required
amount of identifiers as outlined in Section 3.2.
Running Costs The evaluation setup relied on virtual ma-
chines with 4 cores and 16GB RAM, which cost e0.031 per
hour and instance25 including VAT. Mapping this to the 3000
reachable IPFS nodes discovered by Henningsen et al. [10]
results in running costs of 3000×0.031e= 93e/h to attack all
reachable nodes simultaneously. This does not allow drawing
conclusions regarding the overall number of active IPFS users,
since it does not respect the network’s churn rate. However, this
has no bearing on the cost of eclipsing all available nodes (as
this number would not change, only individual attack targets
would come and go). Due to libp2p’s routing table not keeping
disconnected peers, a fully eclipsed node is known to be undis-
coverable by the rest of the network. Once this is achieved, the
cost of keeping a node eclipsed drops significantly, since it is
sufficient to maintain as little as four connections to keep the
node from re-connecting to bootstrap nodes. This scenario is no
longer restricted by CPU or RAM utilisation. However, any
churn requires continuous runs of the full attack against newly
joining nodes, which inflates costs. As of IPFS 0.4.23, global
attacks are therefore more economic when targeting bootstrap
nodes. In general, however, this scales linearly with network
size/churn rate, enabling highly efficient, global attacks.
Overall Attack Costs Considering the 75% success rate after
running the attack for 50 minutes against nodes with default
ConnMgr configurations, bootstrap nodes are an economic attack
target depending on attacker budget and time constraints. After
22 https://geizhals.eu/?cat=hdx&xf=5588_HDD 23 Buying physical
disks is significantly cheaper than current rates for cloud storage for the scope
of our attack. 24 https://geizhals.eu/?cat=sysdiv&xf=10863_8%7
E6764_AMD%7E6770_Ryzen+3000 25 https://www.hetzner.com/cloud
Figure 4: Visualization of an attack target’s routing table over
the first 15 minutes for IPFS 0.4.23. Honest peers are green,
malicious peers red, and empty spots in otherwise filled buckets
are shown in grey.
all, once nodes are fully eclipsed, severing all connection to these
nodes will simply trigger the bootstrap routine. Alternatively, a
global attacker can simply wait until nodes restart, given only
the static set of preconfigured bootstrap nodes will be contacted.
Trying to keep bootstrap nodes eclipsed, does requires running
the full attack, since newly joining nodes will continuously
establish connections. Still, at a cost of e0.031 per hour for a
cloud instance, attacking the eight bootstrap nodes used as of
IPFS 0.4.23 results in running costs of 8×0.031e= 0.248e/h.
5 Countermeasures
Our attack only works because it is easily possible to mount
Sybil attacks, which were first introduced by Douceur in 2002.
The easiest way to prevent our attack would hence be to prevent
Sybil attacks. This, however, is hardly feasible in practice given
the open and decentralised-by-design nature of IPFS, and its key
promise to let anyone participate in the network without central
governance. As Douceur put it: “With no logically central,
trusted authority [. . .] it is always possible [. . .] to present
more than one identity [. . .]” [6]. This is further supported
by a 2006 survey by Levine, Shields, and Margolin and by a
more recent study by Mohaisen and Kim [19]. Still, attackers
can be severely hindered weaponising the operation of large
quantities of malicious network nodes. The generation of a large
identifier set cannot practically be mitigated in decentralised
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systems when considering large-scale attacks. After all, it took
us four days to generate enough identifiers to target networks
consisting of billions of nodes. While Proof-of-Work (PoW)-
based ID generation as proposed by Baumgart and Mies [3]
would inflate up-front costs, Prünster et al. [22] have reached
the conclusion that this is is ultimately futile even for modern
systems employing self-certifying identifiers and authenticated
end-to-end encryption. Even a moderately funded attacker
could simply invest in enough computing power to counter any
realistic PoW factor.
Presenting our attack to Protocol Labs as part of the responsi-
ble disclosure process has intensified an already ongoing effort
of hardening IPFS/libp2p, resolving the issue of unconditional
removal of DHT nodes (see Section 3.1) in the libp2p version
that ships with go-ipfs v0.5, as released on April 28, 2020.
Apart from that, many other fixes were released, with go-ipfs
0.6 (published in June) effectively preventing casual attackers
from carrying out the attack presented in this paper.
Protocol Labs allowed us to attack bootstrap nodes running
go-ipfs 0.5 right after its release, as well as performing attack
runs run on 0.6. In accordance with the timeline of releases,
major changes affecting our attack are highlighted for go-ipfs
0.5, followed by a discussion on 0.6 improvements as well as
other fixes related the discovered vulnerabilities.
IPFS 0.5 Mitigations Amongst many other changes, the
libp2p version shipping with go-ipf 0.5 introduced a DHT
eviction strategy including periodic routing table refreshing and
testing peer liveliness based on three parameters: (1) Time of last
successful outbound query, (2) last time a peer was considered
useful (see below), and (3) eviction grace period, which depends
on bucket size and refresh period; typically in the order of 45
minutes. The first parameter is used during periodic routing
table refreshes. In case a peer has not been successfully queried
within the grace period, a ping is issued. Failure to respond
results in eviction. Consequently, stale peers are periodically
removed from the DHT even if the buckets they reside in still
feature vacant spots.
A peer is considered useful, if, as part of a query it either
responded first, or responding took less than twice the time of
the fastest responding peer. Whenever this condition is met,
the last useful time is recorded. In case a bucket is full, while
another peer shall be added to this bucket, peers whose last
useful time lies beyond the grace period are evicted. However,
responding to a query with an empty result, thus not being
actually useful, is also considered useful. This prevents nodes
from penalising honest peers that simply could not provide the
data required to respond to a query, which helps new nodes join
the network. At the same time, however, becoming useful can be
relatively cheap, since no information is required to still become
useful. In addition, only routing table peers are evaluated for
usefulness, due to the usefulness definition being limited to
DHT operations. Thus, even a theoretic swarm node providing
all content ever queried would not join the routing table easier
than any other node.
As a consequence of these changes, the connection trimming
of the ConnMgr has no immediate effect on the routing table,
since even disconnected peers are remembered and are recon-
nected to if necessary. Thus, lowWater, highWater marks,
and grace period also have no effect on the routing table. Given
that the typical eviction grace period is close to an hour, the
cost of poisoning a target’s routing table is increased several
orders of magnitude compared to mere minutes to fully take
over an IPFS 0.4.23 node’s routing table. In fact, even after
twelve hours, an IPFS 0.5 node in bootstrap configuration still
features honest peers in its routing table (see Fig. 5a).
Shortly after releasing go-ipfs 0.5 on April 28, 2020, Protocol
Labs let us evaluate our attack against one of the production IPFS
bootstrap nodes over three hours in the live IPFS network in order
to gauge the impact of the newly deployed countermeasures.
Since this concrete attack run targeted a production system,
the evaluation period was chosen such that results could be
obtained to make an initial judgement regarding the deployed
countermeasures’ utility without causing any real disruption
to the network. The results are presented in presented Fig. 5b.
Compared to attacking nodes specifically for evaluation purposes
(not used by others for actual bootstrapping), an increased
resilience can be observed. This was to be expected, since the
increased query frequency to bootstrap nodes awards a larger set
of honest peers a useful state. As a consequence, these peers
are kept in the routing table. However, after only one hour, the
initial number of 200+ honest peers in the bootstrap node’s
routing table could be more than halved and stayed below 100,
clearly demonstrating the impact our attack still has on IPFS
0.5. Protocol Labs’s estimate regarding attack difficulty for 0.5,
is that fully poisoning a bootstrap node’s routing table is still
possible within several days.
IPFS 0.6 and 0.7 Measures The most crucial measure to
boost attack costs by orders of magnitude was included in
go-ipfs 0.6 released in June 2020. In effect, IP-addresses are
now considered with respect to adding nodes to the local routing
table, making it impossible to mount large-scale Sybil attacks
from a single host. Instead, at most three nodes associated
with a single host (IPv4, IPv626) can become resident in a
node’s routing table. Therefore, this measure by itself already
inflates the cost of attacking a single node by over two orders
of magnitude compared to IPFS 0.5. Mapping this against the
estimate of several days to fully eclipse a bootstrap node clearly
puts this out of reach for casual attackers. Compared to theoretic
proposals of limiting the numbers of identifiers that can be
advertised to a P2P network per IP address, multiple nodes can
still join the network from the same host. In fact, this aligns with
the distinction between client and server-mode DHT that aims at
mapping to nodes operated behind NATs. In addition, IPFS 0.7
deprecated the previously used transport security mechanism,
26 Even presenting multiple IPv6 addresses from a single large IPV6 subnet has
no effect.
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(a) Attack performance on a IPFS 0.5 node run with bootstrap node configuration
over twelve hours. This node baehaved like a regular node and was not used for
actually bootstrapping. Thus, it more closely resembles a regular node, not a
bootstrap node with respect to network interactions.
(b) Attack performance on a live IPFS 0.5 bootstrap node over three hours. The
attacks was launched 15 minutes after starting to collect metrics.
Figure 5: Visualisation of routing tables for go-ipfs 0.5. Higher
attack resiliency can be observed for the bootstrap node due to
interacting with more nodes. In comparison, the attack on a
regular nodes grows increasingly successful over the first five
hours. Honest peers are visualised in green, malicious peers in
red and empty spots in otherwise filled buckets are shown in
grey.
which breaks compatibility to pre-0.6 releases. As a result, older
instances are required to update to a release containing fixes, if
operators want to continue to participate in the network.
Additional Deployed Changes Aside from these key
changes, additional countermeasures were rolled out since
IPFS 0.4.23. These include a fixed score for nodes acting as
relays to prevent relay-based inflation of ConnMgr scores. While
many third-party projects rely on different parts of libp2p’s
functionality, the relaying subsystem is expected to be used in
virtually all P2P-related projects that require connecting users
behind NATs. Therefore, this change is expected to impact many
libp2p-based applications. Moreover, nodes in the lowest two
DHT buckets are exempt from pruning, while higher buckets are
now assigned a fixed score of five points. While this may seem
counter-intuitive, it prevents attackers capable of generating
a huge body of valid identifiers from gaining an advantage
for small network sizes by ConnMgr points awarded from the
DHT subsystem. In effect, nodes are scored more equally due
to these changes. Moreover, libp2p now verifies reachability
of advertised IP addresses, and only adds those nodes who
actually respond to connection requests. This already goes a
long way towards solving the issue of unconditional trust and
makes it harder to become resident in routing tables. In addition,
configuration of direct peering agreements was also elevated to
a core feature of the IPFS reference implementation.
6 Related Work
Our work presents an attack on IPFS, a decentralised peer-to-peer
system in production use. Therefore, this section mainly focuses
on work related to analysing and attacking similar live systems,
since theoretical models and surveys regarding countermeasures
to eclipse and Sybil attacks have been extensively published
before. For these topics, we refer to the works of Levine, Shields,
and Margolin [13] and Mohaisen and Kim [19] already discussed
in Section 5.
Although IPFS was launched in 2013 and has been continu-
ously gaining traction, scientific literature on IPFS is scarce.
Apart from the original whitepaper describing its system prop-
erties [4] and protocol specifications of varying maturity27,
little in-depth documentation on IPFS is currently maintained.
Metrics on the overall IPFS network are also not available.
However, a 2020 paper [10] crawled the live IPFS network,
whose results were used to estimate the cost of our attack in
Section 4. This work also stressed that no countermeasures
against Sybil attacks were in place as of version 0.4.23, contrary
to the original IPFS whitepaper. The authors also observed that
the way IPFS implements content discovery (first querying all
connected peers, only then falling back to querying the DHT
in case none of the contacted peers would serve the requested
content) provides some resilience against eclipse attacks aimed
27 https://github.com/ipfs/specs
12
at the DHT. As our work demonstrates, however, this defence
was extremely limited, making it still possible to fully eclipse a
node in less than one hour with ≈ 75% probability.
Similar to our work on IPFS, Heilman et al. [8] demonstrated
a successful eclipse attack against Bitcoin [20]. On the sur-
face, this attack was based on flaws similar to the issues we
discovered in IPFS. Most prominently, peers that were still
running and maintaining connections to an attack target could
be replaced by fresh malicious peers. Of the countermeasures
deployed to the Bitcoin reference implementation, an adapted
eviction strategy—keeping live peers instead of having them
easily replaced—showed the most impact towards defending
eclipse attacks. Actually carrying out an eclipse attack against
even a single Bitcoin node without such countermeasures is
considerably more expensive than our attack against prior to
version 0.6, due to the fact that widely-distributed IP addresses
are required. This was mainly due to the different organisation
of Bitcoin’s routing tables compared to the libp2p DHT and not
primarily for reasons of hardening against attacks.
An attack that uses similar principles than ours has been shown
to be successful against the Ethereum cryptocurrency [15]28.
However, there are several important differences to our work.
Most prominently, our attack is more powerful, as it works in
near-realtime by tricking a node into actively disconnecting
itself from the rest of the network. In contrast to the attack on
Ethereum, our attack thus requires no other forms of denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks to succeed. This is crucial, as system
downtime could be easily detected, while our attack simply
requires establishing additional connections (many of which can
be multiplexed, thus not showing up on network monitors). The
general issue of how IPFS implements connection management
is distinctly different from Ethereum and also independent of the
DHT-related attack vector that shows similarities to the attack
on Ethereum. As such, our attack is not limited to the DHT
subsystem that shares much of the conceptual functionality of
Ethereum’s P2P network. Moreover, our way of gaming IPFS’s
ConnMgr makes it possible to deliberately have nodes outside
an attackers control induce churn with low effort. This in itself is
an attack not discussed in related works targeting systems used
in practice29. Our attack against IPFS v0.4.23 also takes only
minutes to fully poison any node’s routing table and less than
an hour to fully eclipse a node with high probability, without
requiring additional DoS attacks. In addition, countermeasures
such as non-public mapping from node id to bucket are simply
not applicable to IPFS as it would render one of it core features
defunct. In general, IPFS is a more complex overall system
and the conceptual issue of connection management persists.
As of IPFS 0.6.1, this general issue persists, as it is inherently
difficult to tackle, although no cheap attacks are currently known.
In summary, the attacks against cryptocurrencies require the
target to reboot, take several days to execute, are orders of
magnitude more expensive, and suggested countermeasures are
28 This attack was performed prior to Ehtereum’s planned switch to libp2p.
29 Evaluating the impact of such churn attacks is out of this work’s scope
not applicable to IPFS. The same applies to the follow-up attack
on Ethereum by Henningsen et al. [9].
Most importantly, however, previous estimates for global attacks
provided in these related works do not consider larger network
sizes, which would exponentially inflate the cost of identifier
generation. Our work, in contrast, scales linearly with a net-
work’s size as identifier generation is a constant factor, even
accounting for networks of billions of nodes. In addition, with
Ethereum’s switch to libp2p, our findings can serve as basis for
further, in-depths analysis and hardening efforts that also benefit
the Ethereum community.
In the context of content distribution, a survey of BitTor-
rent [5] is of significance, since IPFS’s Bitswap is based on the
way BitTorrent distributes content among peers. Carried out in
2007 when BitTorrent was immensely popular, the work by
Piatek et al. [21] revealed inherent flaws in the way peers are
awarded for providing content to others. One of this work’s
conclusions is that a small minority of altruistic peers are respon-
sible for BitTorrent robust performance in real-world settings.
This is understandable given that ways to incentivise users to
provide resources to others without any certainty of receiving
something in return is inherently difficult, especially in low-trust
environments. Protocol Labs has recognised this launched the
Filecoin cryptocurrency in summer 2020 as an incentivisation
layer atop IPFS.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced, described, and demonstrated
a successful end-to-end eclipse attack on IPFS. Exploiting
vulnerabilities of the libp2p library, one aspect of our attack
is to successfully poison routing information locally stored
by nodes of IPFS’s underlying P2P network. In addition, we
have shown that our attack enables us to eclipse arbitrary IPFS
nodes and, consequently, to disrupt the entire public DHT-based
IPFS network step-by-step. Applying our attack on live IPFS
nodes demonstrated the attack’s effectiveness and feasibility.
Alarmingly, conducted evaluations have shown that even global
attacks can be already mounted with moderate efforts, making
this attack an option also for attackers with limited resources.
As such, we have shown that our global attack scales well with a
network’s size, fully answering our initial research question.
The impact of our proposed attack is substantial mainly for
two reasons. First, our attack exploits a conceptual flaw in the
connection management of IPFS with no easy solution. Secondly,
our work has lead to a successful, ongoing hardening process.
The whole ecosystem beyond decentralised exchange of data (but
also other IPFS-based services) benefit from upstream releases
incorporating fixes. Two major version of the IPFS reference
implementation were released since roprting our findings to
Protocol Labs, both of which contained fixes, resulting in a huge
increase of attack costs. As a consequence, casual attackers
won’t be able to replicate our attack against updated nodes.
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A Additional Attack Visualisations
Fig. 6 presents a high-level illustration of the progression
of a victim node’s swarm (including buckets) during normal
operation, as well as during our attack. It has to be noted that
the connections are depicted as an unordered set (with buckets
being unordered subsets). Therefore, trimming is not ordered
top-to-bottom in this visualisation. This choice was made
to reflect two real-world aspects of the connection trimming
routine: Connection’s scores do not necessarily correlate with
their position within the buckets or even throughout the ordered
set of buckets as it is implemented by the DHT subsystem.
Moreover, connections’ scores change overtime, causing them
to be reordered between invocations of the connection trimming
routine. Therefore, depicting connections as unordered comes
closer to reality.
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Figure 6: Schematic view of an attack victim’s connections and k-buckets (DHT) lifecycle spanning node launch, bootstrapping,
steady-state regular node operation and total eclipse.
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B Ethical Considerations
Mounting attacks on existing solutions used in practice and
publishing details on these attacks raises ethical issues. This
especially applies to the work presented in this paper, as we
have mounted our attack also on the live network for evaluation
purposes. Although all attacks have been run in the scope of a
responsible-disclosure process and have been closely aligned
and coordinated with Protocol Labs, we are aware that this kind
of research needs to be subject to ethical considerations, which
we hence discuss in this section.
As potential security impacts of the found vulnerabilities were
apparent right after its discovery in April 2020, we immediately
contacted Protocol Labs, initiating a responsible disclosure
process. In the scope of this process, the vulnerability that serves
as basis for our attack has been assigned CVE-2020-1093730.
Furthermore, we have closely aligned follow-up activities with
Protocol Labs to prevent negative impacts on the IPFS live
network while conducting further research. Protocol Labs has
approved submitting this paper and even provided multiple
rounds of feedback and helped ensuring factual accuracy.
Negative impacts have been prevented by the following
measures:
• In general, attacks have been run on self-operated IPFS
nodes only to avoid negative effects on third-party nodes.
• By attacking a single self-operated node at a time, con-
nectivity to this node was impaired, rendering only this
specific node invisible to the rest of the network. This has
no practical side effects, due to the inherent redundancy of
the network.
• When evaluating our attack on bootstrap nodes run by
Protocol Labs (see Section 4), only one was been attacked.
However, four out of eight nodes in total are used for
bootstrapping as of IPFS 0.5. Hence, running our attack on
one node provided tangible results without causing adverse
effects.
Closely involving Protocol Labs and carefully coordinating
each step of our attacks assured that our research did not
harm live deployments. Protocol Labs actively supported our
research, e.g. by monitoring bootstrap nodes under attack and
providing direct monitoring of nodes under attack. Overall, the
team at Protocol Labs acted professionally, actively supported
us in evaluating our attack against core IPFS infrastructure,
and invited further research based on our discoveries. Public
disclosure of the found vulnerability has been coordinated with
Protocol Labs for October 2020 which includes publishing
this eprint version of this paper and a blog post on the official
IPFS blog31. At this point in time, a hardened version of IPFS
will have been available for several months, which includes
30 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2020-10937
31 https://blog.ipfs.io/2020-10-30-dht-hardening/
mitigation and substantially raises the bar for exploiting the
vulnerability described in this work. The work presented in this
paper contributed to the development of this hardened version of
IPFS.
C Evaluation Procedure
The generic attack setup used for evaluating attack performance
consisted of one control server and one ID server (see Sec-
tion 3.2), as well as one virtual machine acting as victim and
one acting as attacker for each evaluation run. The victim and
the attacker have been deployed at different hosters and regions.
The control server can control an arbitrary number of victims
and attackers simultaneously. nmon32 was used to collect CPU,
memory, and network metrics both for victim and attacker
instances. A so-called swarm-monitor script was used at the
victim to monitor swarm state (attackers vs. honest peers). The
main attack binary is referred to as ipfs_atk.
For every evaluation/run the following procedure was carried
out:
1. Clean up the target, by killing all nmon, swarm-monitor,
and ipfs processes and deleting the IPFS configuration.
2. Killing all nmon and ipfs_atk processes on the attacker
machine.
3. Initialise the IPFS configuration. Additionally, the
lowWater, highWater marks, and the grace period val-
ues are set depending on the evaluation scenario.
4. Start the IPFS daemon on the target machine.
5. Query the ID of the target through the main IPFS network.
6. Prepare the attacker by loading the pre-generated IDs for
the attacker nodes from the ID server and generating all
files necessary for the attack.
7. Query the target periodically for the number of connected
peers. This step is repeated until the number of peers
surpasses the configured highWater value, to ensure the
target is well connected.
8. After this threshold is reached, the logging scripts and
processes are started.
9. Next, wait for 5 minutes and start the attack afterwards.
10. Let the attack continue for a configurable time-period. This
period is referred to as attack duration.
11. On the target, the number of peers, grouped in two cate-
gories, attacker nodes and honest nodes are recorded by
the swarm-monitor script. On the attacker side, the results
of periodic routing table poisoning are logged. On both




12. After the attack duration period all logging-related script
and processes on the target and the attacker machine are
stopped, followed by the attack itself.
13. After each run, logs are downloaded and the target machine
is rebooted to prevent impacts of previous attacks on future
runs.
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D Scaled-Up Evaluation Figures
This appendix provides scaled-up versions of the original figures
found in the main paper for a more legible, detailed interpretation
of results.
Figure 7: Re-scaled version for Figure 4: Visualisation of an
attack target’s routing table over the first 15 minutes for IPFS
0.4.23. Honest peers are visualized in green, malicious peers
in red and empty spots in otherwise filled buckets are shown
in grey. The x-axis shows time slots one minute apart and the
y-axis shows buckets.
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(a) Default settings (lowWater=600, highWater=900, grace period=20s)
(b) Bootstrap settings (lowWater=1000, highWater=2000, grace period=60s). Two runs failed
mid-way for reasons unknown.
Figure 8: Re-scaled version of Figure 2: Visualisation of the number nodes in an attack target’s swarm and routing table for 100 runs.
The red/orange graphs show the number of attacker nodes, while the green/blue ones show the number of honest nodes.
20
























Figure 9: Re-scaled version of Figure 3: Probability of eclipsing a node with default settings (lowWater=600, highWater=900, grace
period=20s)
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Figure 10: Re-scaled version of Figure 5b: Visualisation of the bootstrap node’s routing table over an attack duration of three hours for
IPFS 0.5.0. Honest peers are visualised in green, malicious peers in red and empty spots in otherwise filled buckets are shown in grey.
The x-axis shows time slots one hour apart and the y-axis shows buckets. The attacks was launched 15 minutes after starting to collect
metrics.
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